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DOING DEMOCRACY 'DIFFERENTLY': THE
TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL OF HUMAN
RIGHTS NGOs IN TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL
SOCIETY
Julie Mertus*
It is time to give a different content to 'democracy', to retool it so
that it can work for and not against the progressive transformation of
communities. Breaking out of the present limited vision of
representative democracy in the international community of states
entails both an expansion of its terrain and an improvement of its
techniques.' Doing democracy differently does not mean duplicating
state structures at the peripheries - that is, simply shifting them above
and below the state. Rather, to do democracy differently entails
widening its terrain to include the space known as transnational civil
society and improving the techniques of the democratic enterprise to
promote enriched norms of participation, transparency and
accountability.
2
The emphasis of any democratic enterprise is necessarily shaped
by circumstances of time and place. My focus is on the transnational
civil society3 created in the wake of post-Cold War globalization and
on its interaction with those who are marginalized and relatively
powerless in the global order. Paul Hirst reminds us that all of the
major political doctrines that have claimed to be democratic - classic
liberalism, democratic socialism and corporatism - have shared a
conception of the state as the central and compulsory organization that
" J.D. Yale Law School, Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University, Pettit College of
Law. This essay benefited from suggestions from Dianne Otto, Richard Falk, Janet Lord and the Dighton
Writer's Workshop (in particular, David Kennedy, Dan Danielsen, Martti Koskenniemi, Outi Korhonen
and Nathaniel Berman). I am also grateful for the research assistance of Katherine Guernsey.
1 Tony Wright, Reinventing Democracy?, in REINVENTING DEMOCRACY 13 (Paul Hirst & Sunil
Khilnani eds., 1996).
2 These norms have become recognized as essential elements of several areas of international law
and practice. See Gregory Fox, Remarks, in Karen Ann Widess, Implementing Democratization: What
Role for International Organizations?, 91 AM. SOC'Y INT'L. L. PROC. 356, 360 (1997).
See, e.g., Jean Cohen & Andrew Arato, The Contemporary Revival of Civil Society, in CIVIL
SOCIETY & POLrrICAL THEORY (1992); Victor Prez-Diaz, The Possibility of Civil Society: Traditions,
Character & Challenges, in CIVIL SOCIETY: THEORY, HISTORY, COMPARISON (1995); Anne-Marie
Slaughter et al., International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of
Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367, 378 (1998); Benedict Kingsbury, Indigenous
Peoples, in International Law: A Constructivist Approach To the Asian Controversy, 92 AM. J. INT'L L.
414 (1998) [hereafter Kingsbury, Indigenous Peoples].
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alone determines the forms of governance within a definite territory.4
And yet the recent rush/push towards economic globalization has
altered both the state and its relationship to wider society and
transformed the nature and character of nonstate actors. The ferment
of democracy from the extremities - democracy from below -- is the
focus of this analysis.
This essay is divided into three parts. First, I outline the main
elements of the post-Cold War developments relating to transnational
civil society and their relationship to globalization, with particular
emphasis on the opening of participation for those who are otherwise
marginalized by the state-based system. Transnational civil society
has the potential to create a 'setting of settings' 5 in which agendas for
progressive change can be worked out, tested and applied. However,
as the second section of my work explains, a counter-democratic
tension limits the role that human rights NGOs currently play in
transnational civil society. Transnational human rights NGOs mainly
do democracy from the top-down, failing to operate according to
norms of participation, transparency and accountability. The final
section of my work suggests an alternative, bottom-up approach. I
argue that we need to do democracy differently if human rights NGOs
in transnational civil society are to fulfill their promise of representing
unheard voices and promoting progressive values across borders.
6
I. NEW OPENINGS FOR DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION IN
TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY
Transnational 'civil society' refers to the space of uncoerced
human association and also the set of relational networks that fill this
space.7 These voluntary associations are constituted by and interact
through transboundary networks8 created for particular political, social
4 Paul Q. Hirst, Democracy and Civil Society, in REINVENTING DEMOCRACY, supra note 1, at 13
[hereafter Paul Hirst, Democracy and Civil Society].
5 Michael Walzer, The Civil Society Argument, in Dimensions Of Radical Democracy 89, 98 (C.
Mouffe, ed., 1992) [hereafter Walzer, The Civil Society Argument].
6 See Richard Falk, The Global Promise of Social Movements: Explorations on the Edge of Time,
12 ALTERNATIVES 173 (1987).
7 Waizer, The Civil Society Argument, supra note 5, at 89. See also Cohen and Arato, supra note 3,
at 38.
8 See Ronald Inglehardt, Modernization And Postmoderization: Culture, Economic And Political
Change, 43 SOCIETIES 188 (1997) (importance of organizational networks); Perez-Diaz, supra note 3, at
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and cultural purposes. 9 Transnational civil society includes such
entities as nongovernmental advocacy organizations (including human
rights organizations), humanitarian service organizations, unions,
religious groups, civic and neighborhood associations, political and
social movements, information and news media, educational
associations, and certain forms of economic organization. 10 Ideally,
the associational life of transnational civil society is open and
encouraging of diverse participation."
The recent rise of transnational civil society and the increasing
importance of nonstate actors' 2  is a product of the complex
90 (noting emerging economic, social and informational networks); Timothy W. Luke, New World Order
or Neo-World Orders: Power, Politics and Ideology in Informationalizing Glocalities in GLOBAL
MODERNITIES 91-107 (Mike Featherstone et. al. eds., 1995) (discussing emerging local/global "webs");
Patricia Chilton, Mechanics of Change: Social Movements, Transnational Coalitions, and the
Transformation Profess in Eastern Europe in BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN: NON-
STATE ACTORS, DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 225 (Thomas Risse-Kappen
ed., 1995) (explaining how "transnationalism takes account of coalitions of non-state actors across
national borders"); Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented States and
the Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1014 (1996-97) (networks in international
economic systems contributing to fragmentation). For an excellent case study of the impact of
international networks on global politics, consider the nuclear freeze campaign. See COALITIONS &
POLITICAL MOVEMENTS: THE LESSONS OF THE NUCLEAR FREEZE (Thomas R. Rochon & David S. Meyer
eds., 1997).
Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Reconstructing World Politics: the Emergence of Global Civil Society, 21
MILLENNIUM: J. OF INT'L STUDIES 389, 393 (1992) (emphasizing that this concept of civil society refers
to something broader than social networks).
'0 For an overview with respect to the human rights movement, see HENRY 1. STEINER, DIVERSE
PARTNERS: NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1991). One
debate that will not be resolved here is whether business nongovernmental organizations should be
considered part of civil society. Hegel and his followers define civil society as that which is apart from
the state. Many theorists writing today see civil society as the space "mediating between private markets
and 'government'. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCwORLD 285 (1995). A more nuanced view is
that civil society may encompass certain economic institutions, such as worker organizations and
consumer cooperatives that function in private markets but have their origins outside the market. See
Michael Wazer, A Better Vision: The Idea of Civil Society: A Path to Social Reconstruction, DISSENT
293, 300 (Spring 1996). See also ROBERT HEILBRONER, BEYOND THE VEIL OF ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN
WORLDLY PHILOSOPHY 13-34 (1988) (proposing economic sphere as civil society); DAVID HELD,
MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 300 (1987) (arguing that democratic civil society is incompatible with
unrestricted private ownership).
" A primary work supporting this thesis is ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK:
CIVIL TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY (1993). Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers have also suggested that
straightening voluntary associations could rejuvenate the democratic state. See Joshua Cohen and Joel
Rogers, Associations and Democracy, in I ASSOCIATIONS AND DEMOCRACY: THE REAL UTOPIAS
PROJECT 1-110 (Erik Olin Wright ed., 1995). But see MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION (1982) (underscoring the difficulties and contradictions with collective action).
12 See John Spanier, Who are the 'Non-State Actors'? in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 43 (William C. Olson ed., 1991); Benedict Kingsbury, Whose International
Law? Sovereignty and Non-State Groups, 88 AM. SOC'Y INTL'L. L. PROC. 1 (1994). Note that this essay
uses the term nonstate actor to refer to an actor that is not answerable to a state and Rosalyn Higgins' term
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phenomenon known as globalization. Richard Falk's distinction
between 'globalization from above' and 'globalization from below'
identifies two interrelated tendencies: the restructuring of the world
economy on a regional and global scale through the agency of
transnational corporations and financial markets from above, and the
rise of transnational social forces concerned with environmental
protection, human rights, and peace and human security from below.'
3
Both globalization from above and globalization from below are not
'natural', 'private' or 'apolitical' phenomena, but rather are political,
public and contestable processes that are constituted through the
actions of people.' 4  The impact of globalization from above and
below is the creation of a transnational civil society, a space beyond
the boundaries of states where individuals and groups interact and
shape collective life.' 5
Globalization opens spaces for transnational civil society. First,
globalization refers to increasing interdependence at the world level,
wherein the activities of people in specific areas have repercussions
that move beyond local, regional or national borders. Human rights
problems in an interdependent world increasingly cross state borders.'
6
Thus, for example, products that present environmental hazards
endanger the health of people in numerous states.' 7  The
interdependence of markets can result in reverberating cross-border
explosions when one or a few markets falter, resulting in mass
migration and widespread threats to economic and social rights. In
order to find solutions to such issues, human rights NGOs working at
'participants' to refer to all to whom intemational lhw is applicable. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS
AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE IT 94 (1994).
3 Richard Falk, The Right to Self.Determination Under International Law: The Coherence of
Doctrine Versus the Incoherence of Experience, In SELF-DETERMINATION AND SELF-ADMINISTRATION:
A SOURCEBOOK 335 (W. Danspeckgruber ed., 1997).
14 See Anne Orford & Jennifer Beard, Making the State Safe for the Market: The World Bank's
World Development Report 1997, 22 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 195. 216 (1998).
15 Richard Price, Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines, 52
INT'L ORG. 613, 627 (1998).
16 For early articulations of the interdependence theory, see TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
WORLD POLITICS (Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr. ed., 1972).
17 Alexandre Kiss, The International Protection of the Environment, in INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CLASSIC & CONTEMPORARY READINGS (Charlotte Ku & Paul Diehl eds., 1998); Edith Brown Weiss,
Planetary Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: ISSUES & ACTION (Richard Claude &
Bums Weston eds., 1992); Pdrez-Diaz, supra note 3, at 90; see generally, Hugh J. Marbury, Hazardous




all levels of communities must find new ways to gather information
and conduct transborder advocacy.
Second, globalization results in the fragmentation of states and
peoples into autonomous groups and areas. In a globalized world,
homogeneity is no longer a feasible expectation. The club of
globalization encourages and in some cases even demands that
minority cultures form their own economic, social and cultural
networks to preserve and promote their own collective interests.1
8
Associations also form around identity markers such as language,
culture and kinship. 19  Identity groups place increased demands for
their own rights to culture, language, and association.20 While the
ability of minority cultures to assert their interests is a positive
development, the formation of identity groups may, by design or as an
unintentional by-product, threaten the human rights of other identity
groups. The markers chosen by identity groups cross state boundaries,
but within a demarcated territory or population.21 The rise of identity
groups is experienced as fragmentary because it emphasizes the
division of an imagined larger identity into smaller pieces.
Fragmentation may serve to secure identity in a way that promotes the
ability of minority cultures to work for justice. Yet when tensions
between identity groups are manipulated by local power brokers, 22 a
combative, pluralistic civil society may drain itself of life.
Transnational civil society needs to recognize both the positive and
negative potential of fragmentation.
Third, globalization also results in some degree ofhomogenization23 and uniformity.24 Two branches to this process of
"See, e.g., Sol Picciotto, supra note 8, at 1014; DAVID KNOKE, POLITICAL NETWORKS: THE
STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE 76-81 (1990).
19 See generally examples in HUGH POULTON & SUHA TAI-TAROUKI, MUSLiM IDENTITY AND THE
BALKAN STATE (1997); Benedict Kingsbury, Indigenous Peoples, supra note 3, at 414.
20 See David S. Meyer & Sidney Tarrow, A Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New
Century, in THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT SOCIETY: CONTENTIOUS POLITICS FOR A NEW CENTURY 1. 18
(David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow ed., 1998).
21 Muslim identity in Bosnia provides a good illustration of these phenomena. See TONE BRIGA,
BEING MUSLIM THE BOSNIAN WAY: IDENTITY AND COMMUNrrY IN A CENTRAL BOSNIAN VILLAGE
(1995).
22 See JULIE MERTUS, KOSOVO: How MYTHS AND TRUTHS STARTED A WAR (1999).
23 See Benedict Kingsbury , The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of
International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345, 421 (1994) (hereafter Kingsbury, The Concept of
Compliance]; see also, Ileana M. Porras, A Latcrit Sensibility Approaches the International: Reflections
on Environmental Rights as Third Generation Solidarity Rights, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 413,
424(1997).
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unification can be identified. The first, with its tremendous
implications for participation in civil society, has been described as "a
growing element of global consciousness in the way the members of
global civil society act". 5 Participants in transnational civil societ~y
are progressively agreeing on norms for their own participation 2 .
making possible emerging social constructions based on a more
cooperative, problem-solving civil society. For example, general
agreement on norms for participation in human rights discourse have
led to increased participation in international problem-solving of
nongovernmental organizations with similar human rights concerns, as
in the example of women's human rights groups operating in several
states.28  At the same time, however, this unification ignores
differences in participation resources and threatens to silence
alternative methods of working toward progressive social
transformations. Transnational civil society can help to guard against
the negative aspects of unification of participatory norms by
permitting alternative avenues for participation by those with outside
methodologies.
The second branch of unification is the so-called McDonaldization
of the world. 29 The forced imposition of outside ideas on local
circumstances may result in the loss of culture, languages and ideas.
Local nationalisms may be an important source of resistance to
McDonaldization. Reflecting the broader trend toward trans-border
connections, these new reactive nationalisms may become
'transnationalisms' as they connect politicized national entities located
in more than one territory.30 These connections may represent positive
developments as they provide increased opportunities for traditionally
marginalized actors to participate locally and in transnational civil
2 Zdravko Mlinar, Individuation and Globalization: The Transformation of Territorial Social
Organization, in GLOBALIZATION AND TERRITORIAL IDENTITIES 15, 20-22 (Zdravko Mlinar ed., 1992).
2 Lipschutz, supra note 9, at 399.
26 See Albert Bergesen, Turning World System Theory on Its Head, in GLOBAL CULTURE:
NATIONALISM, GLOBALIZATION AND MODERNITY 76 (Mike Featherstone ed., 1990).
27 See Upschutz, supra note 9, at 407.
21 See generally MARGARET KECK AND KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1998); Kathryn Sikkink, Human Rights,
Princiled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America, 47 INT'L ORG. 411 (1993).
See Barber, supra note 10.
30 See Luis Eduardo Guarnizo & Michael Peter Smith, The Location of Transnationalism, in
TRANSNATIONALISM FROM BELOW 3, II (Luis Eduardo Guamizo & Michael Peter Smith eds., 1998).
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society. In some cases, however, local resistance may take the form of
retrenchment of progressive social norms and reactive nationalism,
which can spell disaster for minority groups.31 Transnational civil
society must remember that local resistance may have an underside.
A fourth phenomenon of globalization undercuts homogeneity:
globalization also produces diversification within territorial
communities. As Marshall Berman explains:
Modern environments and experiences cut across all boundaries of
geography and ethnicity, of class and nationality, of religion and
ideology: in this sense, modernity can be said to unite all mankind.
But it is a paradoxical modernity, a unity of disunity: it pours us
into a maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and renewal, of
struggle and contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish32
The easing of border controls in previously restrictive states
bowing to the pressures of globalization results in an inward flow of
goods, information, ideas and people - including people with new and
challenging ideas on human rights. Exposure to alternative ideas
increases the variety of ideas in local spaces. With restrictions on
travel relaxed, "[pleople travel to teach, to learn, to buy, to sell, to kill
and to heal. In doing so, they learn new ways of doing things,
including new forms of social organization, and they come to see the
costs of old ways of doing things". 33 In transnational civil society,
learning through increased interaction goes both ways. Those living in
previously closed states may benefit from the new ideas being brought
in and from the process of interaction; the travelers arriving in
previously closed states may benefit from the new ideas they find there
and discover through the process of interaction. At the same time, if
the ideas on either side are regressive, or the experience of exchange
regressive, a negative transformation could occur as a result.
In sum then, those who are otherwise marginalized by the state-
based system have an interest in the spaces created by globalization in
their local and trans-boundary context. Where a strong and
functioning civil society exists, diverse voices are included and civil
3'See Mertus, supra note 22.
32 MARSHALL BERMAN. ALL THAT IS SOLID MELTS INTO AIR 15 (1982).
33 Upschutz, supra note 9, at 413.
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society actors, taken together, demand and oversee legal constraints on
state and corporate power and the accountability of state and corporate
actors.34  As Stephen Gill has suggested, globalization and the
development of a transnational civil society
[Olpen[s] up new potential for counterhegemonic and progressive
forces to begin to make transnational links, and thereby to insert
themselves in a more differentiated, multilateral world order. This
would be a way to advance the process of democratization of an
emerging global civil society. This might then provide the
political space and social possibility to begin to mobilize for the
solution to deep-seated problems .... 3
In this sense, transnational civil society has the potential to create a
space in which agendas for progressive change can be worked out,
tested and applied. In the next section, I explore how a counter-
democratic tension limits the role human rights NGOs currently play
in transnational civil society.
II. THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS NONGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Transnational NGOs mainly do democracy from the top-down,
failing to operate according to norms of participation, transparency and
accountability. This section explores this phenomenon with specific
attention to transnational human rights NGOs, but the observations
made can be applied generally to other nonstate actors in transnational
civil society. The rise of transnational civil society and nonstate actors
presents a paradox for social change advocates. On the one hand,
transnational civil society can potentially raise and address the
concerns of unheard voices. Indeed, the very existence of a robust
civil society may be seen as a precondition to the realization of
decidedly progressive democratic norms: transparency, accountability
and participation. 36 On the other hand, NGOs in transnational civil
society often act in a manner that silences marginalized voices and
3 See generally, DAVID HELD. MODELS OF DEMocRACY (1987).
s Stephen Gill. Reflections on Global Order and Sociohistorical Time. 16 ALTERNATIVES 311, 311(1991).
"' See Cohen & Arato. supra note 3. at 80 (civil society as "locus of democratization").
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undermines democratic principles of transparency, accountability and
participation.
Transnational NGOs have enormous political significance at all
levels. On the one hand, NGO 'success' can be measured at the
governmental level by examining NGOs' imprint on governmental
policies. For example, NGOs may set the agenda for legislative
debate, propose legislative language and suggest state actions. More
ephemeral is NGO success beyond state behavior that is at the level of
civil society. But through their actions many NGOs attempt to do
much more than write laws; they seek to transform society at all levels
to be more in tune with the values of justice. Peace activists "aim not
only to convince governments to stop making war but also to create
more peaceful societies"." Women's groups seek more than state
laws prohibiting gender discrimination. They aim to chip away at
patriarchal attitudes and imbedded structures that serve to perpetuate
the subordination of women.38 Similarly, international environmental
NGOs attempt to influence more than the operations of specific
international organizations and the creation of international
conventions. They seek to inculcate an 'environmental sensibility' in
deliberations at the individual, organizational, corporate,
governmental, and interstate levels to shape world collective life.39 By
affecting the 'societal mood,' 'cultural drift' or public orientation, the
impact of transnational human rights NGOs can influence both top-
down and bottom-up approaches to social change.40 It is for this
reason that nonparticipatory, unaccountable and nontransparent NGOs
are particularly detrimental to the potential for bottom-up movements:
The multi-directional ways in which agendas at all levels of society are
influenced by NGOs goes unchecked.
The processes by which many transnational human rights NGOs
operate threaten local autonomy. There is the potential for the
interplay between transnational and local to improve associational life
3' Paul Wapner, Politics Beyond the State: Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics, 47
WORLD POLITICS 311, 321 (1995). See also PAUL JOSEPH, PEACE POLITICS 147-51 (1993).
38 See Joseph Gusfield, Social Movements and Social Change: Perspectives on Linearity and
Fluidity, in RESEARCH IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: CONFLICTS AND CHANGE 326 (Louis Kriesberg ed.,
1981).
" Wapner, supra note 37, at 121,
40 See Herbert Blumer, Social Movements. in STUDIES IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: A SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (Barry McLaughlin ed., 1969).
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at both the local and transnational levels by bringing together actors
that do not ordinarily meet. 41 In a two-directional process, local NGOs
learn strategies and substantive information from their participation
that can be used locally, in efforts to shape the form and operation of
domestic law and practice, and international NGOs learn strategies and
information from local NGOs.42 But often transnational human rights
NGOs' interaction with local communities amounts to little more than
using them for information gathering assistance (i.e., the foreign NGO
gathers information for later distribution in Geneva and New York that
is not even shared with local counterparts). Heavy-handed
transnational human rights NGOs foist their agenda on their local
counterparts, irrespective of its relevance for locals. 43 While locals are
often able to adapt NGO assistance in a manner that suits their needs,
an enormous power imbalance renders independent decision-making
impossible.
44
A transnational human rights NGO concerned with democracy
from the bottom up would focus on the empowerment of local
communities. For many transnational human rights NGOs, however,
local empowerment is a mere by-product of the work, not an intended
goal. The prime tactic of many human rights NGOs is directed to the
mobilization of shame of governments 45, instead of empowerment of
people. The techniques of transnational human rights NGOs include:
the monitoring and surveillance of human rights problems; notification
of emergency situations; the dissemination of information about
human rights norms and their violations to the general public; the
exchange of such information with other nonstate participants in
transnational civil society; the reporting of human rights problems to
state and international bodies; and ongoing or ad hoc consultation with
41 Wapner, supra note 37, at 127.
42 See Nim Broner Worcman, Local Groups Think Globally, 95 TECHNOLOGY REV., Oct. 1992, at
36. 4 For example, traditionally marginalized women's groups have been known to organize
conferences on domestic violence in countries where the top concern of women is not violence but
privatization. See Julie Mertus, Human Rights of Women in Central and Eastern Europe, 6 AM. U. J.
GENDER & L. 369 (1998).
44 See Julie Mertus, The Liberal State vs. The National Soul, 8 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 121 (1999).




governments or international human rights bodies.46 Through the
investigation and publicizing of human rights norms, transnational
human rights NGOs have been extremely influential in shaping
domestic and international agendas on such matters as the protection
of the environment 47, the banning of landmines 48, the promotion of
women's human rights4 9 and human rights in general. Yet such
influence often has been achieved with little attention to local
empowerment and, in some cases, despite the alternative goals of local
actors.
51
Marginalized voices have difficulty penetrating the agenda of
transnational human rights NGOs when their operations are not
transparent and participatory. The many ways in which NGOs, acting
individually and in networks, wield influence on decision-making
often occurs 'behind closed doors' and without pluralistic
participation. The agenda of women's human rights groups for the
World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993, for example,
was developed largely by women from influential Western institutions.
These leaders sought to promote inclusion and transparency by
operating on a 'caucus basis' through which they did their agenda-
setting work while simultaneously trying to co-opt individuals from
46 See Peter J. Spiro, New Global Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International
Decision-Making Institutions, 18 WASH. Q. 45 (1995). See generally Laurie S. Wiseberg, Human Rights
Nongovernmental Organizations, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION
372-84 (Richard Pierre Clause & Bums Weston eds., 2 d ed. 1992); PRESSURE GROUPS IN THE GLOBAL
SYSTEM: THE TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS OF ISSUE-ORIENTED NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
(Peter Willetts ed., 1982); A. Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the
Development of International Environmental Law, 68 CHI-KENT L. REV. 61 (1992).4XSee Kal Raustiala, States NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions, 41 INT'L STUD. Q.
710 (1997); THOMAS PRINCEN AND MATrHIAS FINGER, ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS IN WORLD POLITICS
(1994).
" See Richard Price, supra note 15, at 613.
49 See Martha Alter Chen, Engendering World Conferences: The International Women's Movement
and the UN, in NGOS, THE UN & GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 139 (Thomas G. Weiss & Leon Gordenker eds.,
1996).
50 Felice D. Gaer, Reality Check: Human Rights NGOs Confront Governments at the UN, in NGOS,
THE UN & GLOBAL GOVERNANCE supra note 49, at 51.
"' For example, some well-intentioned but misguided women's organizations have pushed women's
rights issues in new governments in Central and Eastern Europe, funding such things as the drafting of
'Western-model' legislation and the insertion of Eastern Europe into international instruments and
meetings pertaining to women such as the Declaration and Platform for Action of the Fourth United
Nations World Conference for Women in Beijing in 1995. These actions had little impact on the
empowerment of grassroots groups in Eastern Europe and indeed ran contrary to many grassroots group's
goals, which tended to focus on local economic and social issues instead of formal legislation and
international meetings.
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other NGOs to participate in the process in order to make it more
representative. 52 Nonetheless, the agenda emerging from this process
did not include many minority voices on rights issues and the selection
procedure of both participants and agenda items was not transparent to
'outsiders'. 53  Moreover, the deals eventually struck between
individual representatives of NGOs and state leaders were the result of
quiet lobbying, not the product of a visible and accessible process. To
some extent, this is the way the UN 'works' and the issue is not just
about how NGOs are internally organized, but also about the way that
NGOs are expected to operate or fit into existing UN practices.
Nonetheless, it must be remembered that powerful NGOs designed the
'backdoor process' as the means of participation and they therefore
have little incentive to change it.
Most transnational human rights NGOs have failed to adopt
bottom-up styles of democracy. International NGOs that have worked
over the past ten to twenty years in consultative status with the United
Nations, for example, are among the NGOs least likely to base their
policies on the concerns of a highly participatory constituency.
54
Studies have found that the closer an NGO is to the grass-roots level,
the greater its chances at promoting positive social change because it is
more likely to represent a highly motivated and engaged
constituency." The direction of change in such a situation is bottom
up because locals with ties to the grassroots drive the NGO. On the
other hand, the direction of change promoted by a NGO with no tie to
the grassroots is top-down and, consequently, ineffective at promoting
long-lasting transformative change. The experience of NGO work in
Bosnia, for example, reveals organizations driven more by
opportunism than the goal of working toward some ethical vision and
representing the concerns of a constituency. Such organizations have
56
only a temporary and superficial impact on social structures.
52 Donna Sullivan, Remarks, in The Growing Role of Nongovernmental Organizations, 89 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L PROC. 413 (1995).
53 Julie Mertus & Pamela Goldberg. A Perspective on Women and International Human Rights After
the Vienna Declaration: The Inside/Outside Construct. 26 N.Y. U. J. INT'L & POL. 201 (1994).
Sullivan, supra note 52.
"See M. CASTELLS, THE CnTy AND THE GRASSROOTS (1983); Philip Oxhom. Controlled Inclusion
to Coerced Marginalization, in CIVIL SOCIETY: THEORY, HISTORY AND COMPARISON 250, 267-69 (John
Hall ed., 1995).
56 See Ian Smillie, Service Delivery or Civil Society: Nongovernmental Organizations in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (December 1996) (manuscript of memorandum sent to nongovernmental organizations and
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The institutionalized public sphere of transnational civil society is
not truly open to all voices and some interlocutors remain muted in
their attempt to be heard. In such cases, subordinated groups may
create their own fora for expression - in Nancy Fraser's terms, -
"subaltern counterpublics", or "parallel discursive areas where
members of the subordinated social groups invent and circulate
counter discourses, which in turn permit them to formulate
oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs".
57
Where traditionally marginalized actors may fear retribution for
exercising their voice, they may create coded means of expression,
often as a form of resistance. 58 Groups with little contact with
marginalized actors, even if well intentioned, are not equipped to read
the hidden transcripts of their sometimes-coded expression. 9 Thus,
even the best attempts of human rights NGOs'to be inclusive may
remain long on aspiration, yet fall short in application. For example,
large outside NGOs could not understand why a grassroots woman's
literacy group in Has, a very traditional, rural part of Kosovo,
continually refused to accept funding for an automobile and to
otherwise operate like a Western woman's group. The activists from
Has preferred to hitch rides with men as a way of providing them with
the feeling that they played an active role in literacy projects.
Acceptance of large amounts of money from any organization would
have engendered jealously and suspicion among male family members
who had the effective power to prevent women and girls from
attending literacy workshops. °
Human rights NGOs run afoul of democratic norms in another
manner: they may violate with impunity specific human rights closely
donors in Bosnia-Herzegovina) [hereafter. Smillie memorandum]. The verdict still is out on social change
experiments in Bosnia. but early work of the author regarding women's rights organizations in Bosnia
tends to support this thesis. See JULIE MERTUS WITH JUDY BENJAMIN, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND
PROTECTION: THE GENDER CONNECTION (1999).
57 Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: a Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing
Democracy. in POSTMODERNISM AND THE RE-READING OF MODERNITY 210 (Francis Barker et. al. eds.,
1992).
Cf. JAMES C. SCOTT, DOMINATION AND THE ART OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS (1990).
Julie Mertus, The Liberal State and the National Soul, supra note 4.,
See Julie Mertus, Women in Kosovo: Contested Terrains - The Role of National Identity in
Shaping and Challenging Gender Identity, in GENDER POLITICS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS: WOMEN
AND SOCIETY IN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE YUGOSLAV SUCCESSOR STATES 17377 (Sabrina P. Ramet ed..
1999).
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connected with democracy promotion. 61 One of the most popular roles
for nongovernmental actors in democracy promotion in the 1990s has
been the monitoring of elections. 62  "The results of such elections,"
Michael Reisman has observed, "serve as evidence of popular
sovereignty and become the basis for international endorsement of the
elected government".63 However, few checks exist on the conduct of
election monitors and, in many cases, monitors may be untrained
volunteers who are not equipped to certify elections as fair and free.
64
In addition, the results of election monitoring may be clouded by
partisan judgments (often passed off as sanctioned by some
international standard).65 A separate problem is that despite their best
attempts at operating in a fair manner, some local NGOs may be
denied funding while others may be funded in excess of what they can
manage. 66  NGOs should be permitted time to develop their own
accountability mechanisms and develop gradually, not artificially fast,
according to some outside timetable.67
At the same time, NGOs are called nongovernmental because they
are not supposed to be mere agents of government. A fundamental
tenant of civil society is that it is independent of (if not oppositional
to) the state.68 A primary measure of the strength of civil society then
is its capacity simultaneously to resist subordination to state authority
and, when desirable, to demand inclusion into state political structures
61 Cf Anne Orford, Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions After the Cold
War, 38 HARV. INT'L L J. 443, 469 (1997) (international institutions, arguably one component of civil
societz, have advocated undemocratic means of achieving liberalization).
Donna Arzt has called election.monitoring missions the "dance craze of the decade". Donna E.
Arzt, Bridge Over Troubled Water: Law and the Emergence of New Democracies, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT'L
L. & COM. 81, 98 n.83 (1996). See David Stoelting, The Challenge of UN-Monitored Elections In
Independent Nations, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 371 (1992).
6 Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J.
INT'L L. 866, 868-69 (1990).
6 See Christopher A. Riley, Neither Free Nor Fair: The 1996 Bosnian Elections And The Failure of
The UN Election-Monitoring Mission, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1173 (1997).
6 Brad Roth, Remarks, in Karen Ann Widess, Implementing Democratization: What Role for
International Organizations?, 91 AM. SOC'Y INT'L. PROC. 356, 367 (1997).
6Smillie memorandum, supra note 56, at iii.
67 Leon Gordenker & Thomas G. Weiss, Devolving Responsibilities: A Framework for Analyzing
NGOs and Services, 18 THiRD WORLD Q. 443, 451 (1997) ("nobody knows to whom NGOs are
answerable").
" Paul Hirst, Democracy and Civil Society, supra note 4. at 97-116.
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on specific issues.69  Some NGOs have their foundations in 'new
social movements', that is they represent values and aspirations
associated with peoples.70 The problem is that too few NGOs maintain
their allegiance to social movements and, instead, over time they may
gain inclusion in state political structures to the extent that they are
reluctant to express alternatives to the state values and programs. 7
Over time, all NGOs may not be strong enough to resist
subordination by the state, because of the benefit of funding and
status. 72  This problem becomes acute when NGOs assume functions
that were once the province of states; for example, social service
delivery and humanitarian relief.73  "Ultimately", Ian Smillie writes,
"there is question as to how much the 'civil society' discourse and
donor infatuation has to do with democracy and human rights, and
how much it has to do with finding cheaper and more efficient
alternatives to faltering government delivery systems". 7' Once they
become a sort of 'public service sub-contractor' 75, NGOs are in
continual danger of having their local accountabilities and ethical
principles compromised by the financial and discursive capacity of
69 Oxhorn, supra note 35, at 252. Some scholars in Eastern Europe have advanced a different view
of civil society. See ZBIGNIEW RAU, THE REEMERGENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN EASTERN EUROPE AND
THE SOVIET UNION (1991) (describing civil society as arenas of resistance to a totalitarian state).
70 Dianne Otto, Nongovernmental Organizations in the United Nations System: The Emerging Role
of International Civil Society, 18 HuM. RTS. Q. 107, 112 (1996)[hereafter Dianne Otto, Nongovernmental
Organizations]. Within any community at tiny point in time, the subaltern may or may not play an active
role in human rights NGOs. Some human rights NGOs cannot by any stretch of the imagination be
termed 'subaltern' with respect to their composition, activities and goals. However, this is not the case in
all places and all periods of time. With respect to the NGOs in the former Yugoslavia, for example, some
kitchen-table organizations were decidedly subaltern while others were composed of some of the most
powerful and privileged members of society who advanced their own narrow agenda with little regard to
the oppressed in their society. Some women's groups in the former Yugoslavia, for example, changed
over time from representing subaltern concerns to promotion of the dominant agenda of local or foreign
elites. (Observation drawn from authors' first-hand work in the former Yugoslavia). The same
phenomenon can be seen with respect to international women's groups. See Julie Merlus & Pamela
Goldberg, supra note 53.
71 See, e.g. STUART WEIR & WENDY HALL, EGO TRIP: EXTRA-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
IN THE UK AND THEIR ACCOUNTABILITY (1994).
72 See Oxhorn, supra note 35, at 252-53.
73 One recent study of this problem is in Antonio Donini, The Bureaucracy and the Free Spirits:
Stagnation and Innovation In the Relationship Between the UN and NGOs, in NGOs, THE UN AND
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 49, at 67.
74 IAN SMIuL, THE ALMS BAZAAR 237 (1995).
75 See BEYOND UN SUBCONTRACTING: TASK SHARING WITH REGIONAL SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS AND SERVICE-PROVIDING NGOS (Thomas G. Weiss ed., 1998).
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states to shape their agendas.76 When NGOs are dependent on states
or other powerful donors such as the UN, they no longer fulfill their
role as nonstate counterparts in transnational civil society. Instead,
they form patron-client relationships to improve their positions, thus
repeating the old tradition of strong-state/weak-state clientelism.
77
The local NGO sector in Bosnia, for example, developed in a
distorted way with great attention (by the international community) to
service delivery and with very little attention (by the international
community) to sustainability beyond the promise of completion
dates.78 International donors created a dependency situation through
which local NGOs in Bosnia relied upon them for their very existence.
These NGOs must actively promote, or at least not contravene, the
agendas of their donors. In the early stages of the donor process in
Bosnia, local NGOs were a cheap source of service delivery for
foreign donors desiring to provide emergency assistance and
psychosocial services. The shift away from emergency and
psychosocial projects to income generating projects in mid-90s left
many Bosnian NGOs in despair, as they were unable to continue their
programs.79  This focus on inexpensive service delivery via local
NGOs was at odds with the creation of a strong, pluralistic civil
society.80 The donor process in Bosnia can be said to advance the
goals of foreigners; it stretches the imagination, however, to claim that
it advances Bosnian civil society in a meaningful way when very little
will be left behind when donors pull out.
The convergence of NGO and government interests can at times be
traced to the pragmatic intertwining of resources and the reality of
staffing international projects. NGOs receive funding, direction, and
supplies from governments and at times work jointly in the field on
large common endeavors. At the same time, many governments are
dependent upon NGOs for information and expertise. Above all, there
76 Dianne Otto, Rethinking the Universality of Human Rights Law, 29 COLUM. H.R. REV. 1, 41
(1997). [Hereafter Otto, Rethinking the Universality].
" See generally, DAVID HULME AND MICHAEL EDWARDS, NGOS, STATES AND DONORS: Too
CLOSE FOR COMFORT? (1997).
78 Memo from CARE/CRS/DELPHI to Brenda Cupper, dated 19 March 1997 (attaching Smillie
memorandum, supra note 56).
79 Smillie memorandum, supra note 56, at iv. This observation is supported by the author's
interviews with local NGOs in Bosnia in July 1998.
6 See Smillic memorandum, supra note 56, at iv.
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are people 'behind' the projects.81 NGO staff increasingly move
between government jobs and NGO work and as they do so their
visions and the interests of their various employers converge. These
shifts make the agenda of democracy from below complex and, in
some cases, impossible. The connections are not transparent to those
outside the specific projects in question and the loyalty of the NGO
has shifted from 'the bottom,' as it were, to the 'top'.
Blinded by a romantic attachment to the notion that NGOs are a
spontaneous order independent of and separate from the state, we have
been slow to identify and address transparency and accountability
problems within NGOs. These days few NGOs can be said to be the
kind of spontaneous, private entity envisioned by classic liberal
theory.82 The problem with the "classical liberal legacy of conceiving
civil society as a spontaneous order separate from government", as
Paul Hirst emphasizes, is that it "actually undermines the devising of
effective remedies to the growth of unaccountable hierarchical power
in both the public and private spheres" s.8 3  Within organizations,
romanticism prevents NGO staff from seeing their organization as it is;
an entity that should be held accountable. The failure to require
accountability leaves the power of these organizations unchecked.
Therefore, instead of enhancing citizen participation, many NGOs
have the reverse effect. While some NGOs remain open to public
input, the relatively empowered citizen often has little control over
NGO operations, let alone those who are marginalized. More often,
NGOs set the public agenda on an issue before offering it to the public
for comment. Thus, instead of enhancing the choices of marginalized
citizens, some NGOs serve to restrict it. In short, NGOs "need to be
made accountable in some direct way to the constituencies involved in
or affected by them".8
4
Accountability questions increase in magnitude and complexity
when nonstate actors perform government functions. Increasingly
governments delegate public functions to specialized bodies, charged
81 David Kennedy has made this characterization (made with respect to international projects
generally).
82 For a critique, see Hilary Charlesworth, The PublicdPrivate Distinction and the Right to
Development in International Law, 12 Aus. Y. B. INT'L L. 190 (1992).
' Paul Hirst, "Democracy and Civil Society", supra note 4, at 98.
"Id. at 101.
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with designing, reviewing or implementing what would have
previously been public functions. These bodies may operate with the
stated goals of greater transparency, accountability and more inclusive
participation and, in some cases, these goals may be realized.
Environmental regulatory bodies, formed on either an interstate or sub-
state level, provide one illustration of groups composed of
professionals who open their day-to-day policy deliberations and
operations to public comment and scrutiny. ° A danger, however, is
posed where nonstate actors take on public functions without
mechanisms of accountability. Reconceptualizing aspects of the
public sphere as private means that decisions concerning such newly
privatized issues are kept from public scrutiny or control.
The World Bank has played a leading role in encouraging states to
limit public sector activities by privatizing these activities and cutting
state expenditures.87  Potentially profitable public agencies are
privatized and left in the hands of foreign and local investors. A role
is played by NGOs as well. They provide the services that the state
has abandoned and private investors have scorned as unprofitable,
such as health, education, microcredit, vocational training,
professional services, research and civic education. 8 While the World
Bank expects these NGOs to be accountable to citizens, no such
expectations are brought to bear on for-profit privatized services.
Privatized public services need only demonstrate greater managerial
accountability for outputs or outcomes.8 9  As Anne Orford and
Jennifer Beard explain:
There is little consideration of the possible need to constrain the
power of the new market-oriented state, nor is there any reference
to the need to ensure that private actors be subjected to the ongoing
requirements to account to the people of a particular state once
85 See generally, Ken Conca, Greening the UN: Environmental Organizations and the UN System, in
NGOs, THE UN & GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 49, at 105; THE STATE AND SOCIAL POWER IN
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS ( Ronnie D. Lipschutz & Ken Cocca eds., 1993); Harold K. Jacobson
and Edith Brown-Weiss, Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords:
Preliminary Observations From a Collaborative Project, I GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 119 (1995); Wapner,
supra note 37.
86 Anne Orford & Jennifer Beard, supra note 14, at 207.
17 See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997: THE STATE IN A CHANGING
WORLD (1997).
8 Orford & Beard, supra note 14, at 208.
89 Id. at 207 (citing 1997 World Bank Report at 9-10).
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public sector activities have been privatized. We are simply to
assume that all those who act in the private sector automatically
make decisions for the greater good of the general public. Such an
assumption is premised upon faith in the efficient and benign
operation of the market.9°
The NGOs that take over public sector services become complicit
in this process. Not only are they not constrained by any minimum
standards of accountability, they collaborate in the process through
which citizens are denied the ability to choose their own form of
economic or social arrangements.
9
'
With all of these limitations, how can NGOs possibly fulfill their
potential role of adding a 'third voice' in international relations, one
autonomous both from government and markets? 92  One way, I
suggest, is to do democracy differently - to take seriously the notion of
democracy from below. This would mean ensuring that NGOs adhere
to the norms of transparency, accountability and participation that
NGOs increasingly demanded of state actors. These norms should be
embraced throughout transnational civil society. In the next section, I
explain how this vision of democracy from below differs from the
prevailing notion of democracy from above and how it is
transformative for societies.
III. FROM 'DEMOCRACY FROM ABOVE' TO 'DEMOCRACY FROM
BELOW'
A. The Present Agenda
Traditional international relations scholarship discusses how the
rise of nonstate actors and the changed role of the state is intertwined
and marked with a shift from 'government' to 'governance'. This
means that fewer commentators are dreaming of the building of
international organizations that generate and administer rules (a
90Id. at 211.
92 d. at 209.92 Otto, Nongovernmental Organizations, supra note 7 1, at 128.
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'world' government)93, and are instead considering non-governmental
means of governing, without centralized sovereign authority, including
relationships that transcend national frontiers. James Rosenau
distinguishes governance from government as follows:
[G]overnment suggests activities that are backed by formal
authority, by police powers to insure the implementation of duly
constituted policies, whereas governance refers to activities backed
by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and
formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely
on police powers to overcome defiance and attain compliance ....
[Governance] embraces governmental institutions, but it also
subsumes informal, nongovernmental mechanisms whereby those
persons and organizations within its purview move ahead, satisfy
their needs, and fulfill their wants. 4
Achieving governance thus necessitates more complex and far
reaching methods across a broader terrain.
International financial institutions contend that they can distinguish
between 'good' and 'bad' governance. According to the World Bank,
governance that may be deemed 'good' is epitomized by "predictable,
open and enlightened policy making, a bureaucracy imbued with a
professional ethos acting in furtherance of the public good, the rule of
law, transparent processes, and a strong civil society participating in
public affairs". 9 ' Poor governance is characterized by "arbitrary
policy making, unaccountable bureaucracies, unenforced or unjust
legal systems, the abuse of executive power, a civil society unengaged
in public life, and widespread corruption".96 The World Bank itself
fails to meet the standards of accountability and transparency, and, as
93 For a reformist call for global governance that still embodies an institutional focus, see COMMON
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE 1990s: THE STOCKHOLM INITIATIVE ON GLOBAL SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE
35-42 (1991).
94 James N. Rosenau, Governance, Order and Change in World Politics, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT
GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 3 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel
eds., 1992).
93 Patricia Armstrong, Human Rights and Multilateral Development Banks: Governance Concerns
in Decision Making, 88 AM. SOC'Y INTL'L. L. PROC. 271, 280 (1994) (citing World Bank, Governance:
The World Bank's Experience (Operations Policy Department. Final Draft, Nov. 23, 1993, at 1). See,
William Chia, Quality of Government Outweighs Political System: Prof Koh, BUS. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1993,
at 2; See also, Bill Maurer, Cyberspatial Sovereignties: Offshore Finance, Digital Cash, and the Limits of
Liberalism, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 493, 497 (1998).
" Patricia Armstrong, supra note 95, at 79.
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noted above, does not apply these standards evenly to all international
actors.
97
A key idea associated with the connection between legitimacy and
governance is the 'right to democratic governance', an arguably
emerging human right that finds its grounding in the words of Article
21 of the Universal Declaration: "the will of the people shall be the
basis of the authority of government".98 Thomas Franck, a leading
proponent of this right, argues that "the radical vision [that
governments should rule with the consent of the governed and that
governments that acted in such a manner would be perceived as
legitimate] is rapidly becoming, in our time, a normative rule of the
international system". 99 A word of caution is in order, however, as
there is no one accepted model of democracy and it is debatable
whether any norm of democracy has emerged as customary
international law. 100
Although the elements of the right to democratic governance have
not been clearly defined, it appears to encompass both procedural and
participation-oriented theories about the operation of the rule of law in
a democracy.'10 The 1990 Copenhagen Document of the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, then CSCE) 10 2
underscores the importance of the rule of law for the operation of just
societies, declaring that "societies based... on the rule of law are
prerequisites for.., the lasting order of peace, security, justice, and
cooperation". 10 3  Absent from any OSCE discussion !°4 is any
discussion of vertical responsibilities, or the responsibilities of citizens
toward each other and the responsibilities of collections of citizens
97 On a selective basis, some NGOs are required to comply, while corporate and other newly
privatized activities need not. See Anne Orford & Jennifer Beard, supra note 14, at 211.
98 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21.
" Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Denocratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 46
(1992).
100 See Mertus, The Liberal State and the National Soul, supra note 44.
'0' Cohen and Arato, supra note 3, at 4-8; see also, John Norton Moore, The Rule of Law and
Foreign Policy, 2 HARV. J. WORLD AFF. 92 (1993).
102 The name of the organization changed from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe to the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1974, reflecting its move from a
series of periodic meetings with a loose institutional structure to a more permanent organization with a
more defined structure.
103 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the
Conference on the Human Dimension, June 29, 1990, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1305, 1306 (1990).
104id.
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such as NGOs to citizens. These matters are simply not matters of
high priority.
The formula of the OSCE, U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) and other large Western entities for
democratization is said to include: "legitimization of government
authority" using a "mechanism of periodic competitive elections,"
supported by "civil rights and liberties" as well as a "constitutional
order dedicated to the rule of law". 10 5 In practice, World Bank and
Western government-funded (largely through USAID) efforts to
promote democratization have focused the monitoring of political
elections, virtually to the exclusion of the fostering of other
participatory mechanisms and the nurturing of civil society.' 6 The
justification commonly given for an 'elections first' approach is that
they are democracy's first step. More accurate, however, is an
understanding that there is no single natural order of events for
democracy and that the fostering of participation from below may in
fact be a more important first step than elections.10 7
A 'one size fits all' and 'instant' vision of democracy creates new
opportunities for Western imperialism.10 8 In the name of democracy,
foreign governments interfere with the internal processes of local
communities. Invocations of democratic principles in specific political
controversies, either at the state or sub-state level, are by nature
ideologically skewed and manipulative. 10 9  Foreign government
funding to local "pro-democracy" groups is particularly suspect.
Foreign governments fund political organizations that share their
values and goals, favoring foreign transplants over indigenously
created groups with different agendas. 1 0 When foreign funding is
necessary for survival, indigenous groups transform themselves (at
least publicly) to be acceptable enough to the foreigners to obtain their
money. This may mean neglecting the interests of grassroots actors
103 Susan Marks, Remarks, in Karen Ann Widess, Implementing Democratization: What Role for
International Organizations?, 91 AM. SOC'Y INT'L. PROC. 356, 371 (1997).
106 Donna E. Arzt, supra note 62, at 98; see also Dianne Otto, Challenging the 'New World Order':
International Law, Global Derocracy and Possibilities for Women, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEM.
PROBS. 371, 378 (1993) [hereafter Otto, New World].
1o7 Susan Marks, supra note 105, at 373.
'as Otto, "New World", supra note 106, at 383.109 Brad Roth, supra note 67, at 367.
1o Holly Burkhalter, Remarks, in Farhana Y. Khera, Democratization and International Law:
Building the Institutions of Civil Society, 88 AM. SOC'Y INT'L. PROC. 197,210 (1994).
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and adapting the foreign obsession with top-down, electoral focused
democracy. Consequently, foreign funding of top-down democracy
projects serves to subvert and squelch bottom-up democracy.
The transplant of Western style, market-oriented democracy not
only fails to address the needs of participatory democracy from below,
but it also cannot be transplanted to other countries and to international
institutions without violating international human rights norms."' The
idea of democracy in international human rights law, as articulated in
the Declaration from the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights
and many international human rights instruments and proceedings, is
said to be "based on the freely expressed will of the people to
determine their own political, economic, social and cultural
systems"." 2 Interpretation of this is controversial, but whenever state
or nonstate participants coerce weak governments to accept a narrow
vision of representative democracy, core principles of democracy are
trampled.' 13 Whenever state or nonstate participants use elections to
accord legitimacy to an authoritarian regime that it formerly lacked,
the resulting 'cosmetic' democracy thwarts fundamental ideals of self-
government and equality. 1 4 Invocation of the term 'democracy' by
foreign donors makes human rights advocates wary, "not only because
of the very colorful and checkered past of the United States in
manipulating that concept, but also because of the eagerness of cynical
governments that have abusive records to manipulate it". 15 The result
is control from above and suppression of voices from below.
In conclusion, the agenda of democratization from above has at
best been extremely limited and ineffective at promoting the norms of
participation, transparency and accountability.' 6 This is no surprise.
A top-down agenda for democracy was never designed to promote
these norms fully or equitably. Instead the top-down approach was
.. See Richard Falk, The Right to Self-Determination Under International Law: The Coherence of
Doctrine Versus the Incoherence of Experience, in SELF-DETERMINATION AND SELF-ADMINISTRATION: A
SOURCEBOOK 47 (W. Danspeckgruber ed., 1997).
112 Vienna Declaration and Programme for Action, 25 June 1993, para. 5.
13 A case study of this phenomenon is provided in THOMAS CAROUTHERS, IN THE NAME OF
DEMOCRACY: U.S. POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA IN THE REAGAN YEARS (1993).
114 Susan Marks, supra note 105, at 376.
1 5 Holly Burkhalter, supra note I 10, at 203.
.:6 Many commentators critique in greater detail the ways in which the right to democracy has been
implemented on the state level. See, e.g., the contributors to D.L. SHETH & ASHIS NANDY, THE
MULTIVERSE OF DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS IN HOUR OF RANI KOTHARI (1996).
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created to locate and preserve power at the top and to control any
alternative agenda from rising from the bottom. It is a very different
understanding of democracy that empowers people from below.
B. Doing Democracy Differently
The first step towards doing democracy differently is opening up
the concept of democracy so that it is no longer identified solely with
representative democracy from above and market-oriented systems.
For this to happen, the concept of a 'right to democracy' needs re-
imagining if it is to be seen as relevant to all societies and not merely
the transplant of Western values." 7 Dianne Otto suggests a useful way
to think about universality and rights that could steer us in the right
direction. Human rights, she argues, should be framed as "a dialogue,
in the sense of struggle, rather than a civilizing mission"."18 In other
words, the intersections between global ideas of democracy and local
practices and adaptations could be viewed as a process of constant
"transformative dialogue" 19 with neither universalism nor democracy
being rejected but particularized. 20  This entails learning about the
values of democracy and its meaning for structuring relationships by
paying attention "to the ongoing evolution of democratic
discourses"' 12 1 in civil society.
Otto's approach to human rights emphasizes both the relational as
well as constitutive aspects of human rights. Rights matter because
they define relationships; relationships give meaning to rights. The
processes of defining and enforcing rights takes place in the context of
relationships. The process of rights definition and enforcement
demonstrates who we are as a society, what we value, how power is
distributed and how relationships are regulated. This focus on
relationships makes particular sense in our globalized world marked
by an emerging transnational civil society where, as described above,
the varieties of relationships, the kinds of actors and the direction of
11 Cf Martti Koskenniemi, The Police in the Temple. Order, Justice and the UN: A Dialectical
View, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 325, 343 (1995).
"1a Dianne Otto, Rethinking the Universality, supra note 76, at 3.
"9 Id. at 35.
'20 Chantal Mouffe, Radical Democracy: Modem or Postmodem?, in UNIVERSAL ABANDON? THE
POLITICS OF POSTMODERNISM 36 (Andrew Ross ed., 1988).
121 Otto, New World Order, supra note 106, at 400.
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dialogue are complex and changing. It also makes sense in a world
transformed by the ideas of democratic governance, for these concepts
have key relational and constitutive components.
A relational standpoint helps to reconceive democracy in more
open terms. In this way, democracy is understood "as an ideal of self-
government and equality, as a catalyst, orientation and framework for
criticism and transformation of the conditions of collective life". 122
This reconceptualization would de-domesticate the notion of
democracy; in other words it would move it from a hegemonic
domestic construct to a more particularized and local domestic
construct. Susan Marks laments that "[it would seem to me to be
unfortunate indeed if democracy, an idea that has so often served to
inspire and justify 'revolutionary politics aiming at the roots of
existing distributional systems,' were allowed to become the
monopoly of those who would have it do the reverse". 23 Instead of
being associated with any cultural or political specificity (i.e. market
capitalism), a more open idea of democracy could be used by groups at
the margins to present their own view of the good life.
Another step toward doing democracy differently has already been
suggested, namely the expansion of the terrain of democracy to
include transnational civil society. Democracy needs to flow
downwards and sideways as well as upwards, enriching associational
life. In this vision, what happens at the margins matters -- "power is
conceptualized as dispersed throughout the global polity rather
than... centralized in the state and the economy". 124 The array of
participatory democratic opportunities involves all aspects of
community life, beyond the traditional focus on elections and political
rights, and beyond the building of democratic institutions.125  A
diverse array of NGOs thus should be involved both in the creation,
monitoring and workings of transnational democratic institutions as
well as the reformation of democratic norms.
A related element of doing democracy differently involves
recognition of a 'right to democracy' that flows horizontally, up and
'2 Susan Marks, supra note 105. at 375.
123 Id. at 376 (citing Martti Koskenniemi. "Intolerant Democracies": A Reaction, 37 HARV. INT'L L.
J. 231, 234 (1996)(waning that a universal norm of democracy can be used against revolutionary politics).
12A Otto, Nongovernmental Organizations, supra note 71, at 134.
125 Otto. New World Order, supra note 106, at 399.
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down between state and citizens, with no limitations as to any private
or public powers. This orientation can be seen as extending and
critiquing the vertical/horizontal divide in international human rights
theory. A vertical view of human rights focuses on the relationship
between the state and the individual: rights flow in one direction, down
from the state to the individual and rights claims flow in one direction
as well, up from the individual to the state. A horizontal view of
human rights focuses on the relationships 'at the same level', that is of
individuals to one another and, to some extent, of state actors to one
another: rights and responsibilities flow in both directions between
these actors. As discussed previously, this view of thinking is more in
line with how transnational human rights NGOs aim to work.
Although many NGOs work top-down and thus appear to be acting
solely in a vertical manner, their goal is to influence horizontal
relationships as well. They attempt to influence not only governments
but also citizens as well, and impetus and impacts of NGO action are
felt both top-down and bottom-up.126
This approach would recognizes a range of legitimate stakeholders
in decision-making and seek ways in which these stakeholders can
have an effective voice. An approach of this kind would not construct
iron walls between 'public' and 'private' centers of power, but instead
would apply norms of rights and responsibilities to both.127 The main
vehicle for promoting these norms targets the enhancement of those
principles of accountability, participation and openness. Human rights
advocates should take steps to ensure more accountability and
transparency for nonstate participants, in everything they do and
especially when they take on state functions.
NGOs should not be held hostage to government donors under
some theory of accountability. In demanding greater transparency and
accountability for NGOs, care should be taken to ensure that the
12 For example, environmental and human rights NOOs have sought to hold nonstate corporate
entities accountable for their behavior. NGOs take direct action against corporations that violate basic
norms for behavior, organizing boycotts of companies that trap endangered animals, exploit child labor,
and produce non-biodegradable paper wrappings for food products. In addition, NGOs have drafted
corporate codes of conduct, urging corporations to pledge to adhere to minimum standards of social
behavior. These and other measures help to define the boundaries of good conduct and thus animate how
a host of actors -- from governments to voluntary associations and ordinary citizens - think and respond.
Wapner, supra note 37, and accompanying text.
127 Tony Wright, supra note I. at 13.
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demands for accountability are not simply an effort by fading
government bureaucracies to retain control through proxies.
Accountability to governments is not the main concern here. NGOs
should engage in self-regulation in order to be accountable and
transparent to people and, thus, more likely to promote bottom-up
participation. 12 Thus, as Eric Dannemaier asserts:
the responsibility of these nongovernmental actors with respect to
this type of ideological accountability should be limited to rules
that promote transparency of mission. This will aid in financial
accountability and in a broader understanding of an organization's
place within society and the political arena, without limiting a
group's mission or attempting to influence its ideology.130
This kind of limited accountability to people will make it easier for
them to know what NGOs are doing and, with this information,
participate in transnational civil society through these NGOs or
through other connections. At the same time, the accountability
should not act as a control on the mission of any NGO, thus remaining
consistent with the tenant of pluralism in bottom-up democracy.
Enhanced openness and pluralism would bring more issues to the
table. To promote transformative social change from the bottom-up,
actors in transnational civil society must be committed also to
addressing the global economic issues that undermine the ability of
some voluntary associations to participate in civil society. Many
studies indicate that globalization exacerbates economic disparities.'
3 1
Globalization has encouraged, and in some cases demanded,
privatization of social services. Researchers have demonstrated, for
example, how privatization of key social services in Latin America,
such as social security, health care and housing, has exacerbated
'2 Ian Smillie, NGOs and Development Assistance: a Change in Mindset?, 18 THiRD WORLD Q.
563, 575 (1997).
'29 Eric Dannemaier, Democracy in Development: Toward a Legal Framework for the Americas, 11
TUL. ENVTL. L. J. I, 26 (1997). Accountability and transparency should be a two-way street. Just as
NGOs adopt codes and other self-governing measures to regulate themselves, governments should take
steps to be more transparent and accountable with respect to their behavior in transnational civil society.
130 id.
131 See, e.g., Dianne Otto, Rethinking the Universality, supra note 76, at 44 ("ITlhe egalitarianism of
modernity has supported the globalization of capital, which has sponsored reduced state obligations with
respect to economic and social rights and deepened the economic disparities between North and South.")
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exclusion of citizens from community life.132  For the most part,
critiques of such changes in the space of transnational civil society
have been left to organizations identified as 'development' or
'economic' groups, and most human rights NGOs have had little say in
the matter. 13 3  Full and complete realization of the goals of the
Universal Declaration, however, requires change. Not only does the
failure of human rights NGOs to engage in global economic justice
issues marginalize such matters, but also it exacerbates the conditions
under which individuals and NGOs can participate in any human rights
dialogue at all. Without access to health care, housing or a living
wage, individuals and groups are hampered in their ability to associate
and voice their concerns. As such, neglect of global justice issues by
human rights NGOs contributes to the democratic deficit in
transnational civil society.
To ensure that democracy from below reaches marginalized actors,
the value of participation needs to be better articulated. We know that
civil society is underdeveloped where small, participatory and
democratically structured organizations independent of the state are
uncommon. 134  We also know that human rights dialogue in
transnational civil society remains underdeveloped when it is
dominated by large, exclusive, undemocratic organizations., 35 But
how do we refine our understanding of participation to realize
transformative democratic goals? One of the main roadblocks to doing
democracy differently lies in the reality that transnational civil society
reflects disparities in power that are not recognized or acknowledged.
Quite simply, well-financed, Western NGOs are likely to have more
power than their poorer and non-Western counterparts, and the lack of
transparency and accountability in transnational civil society is likely
to keep this power unchecked. There is little incentive for powerful
NGOs to recognize the misbalance. Less powerful groups can be
marginalized and their protests remain unheard. Abdullahi An-Na'im
recognizes that "ideally participants should feel on equal footing but,
given existing power relations, those in a position to do so might seek
132 Oxhom, supra note 31, at 253.
"' Michael Posner & Candy Whittome, The Status of Human Rights NGOs, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L REV. 269, 272-76 (1994).




ways of redressing the imbalance". 136 Otto goes farther in insisting
that "transparency of the operations of global networks of power, of
exploitation and domination, is a vitally important component of
transformative dialogue".' 37
The application of democratic principles to transnational civil
society entails more than the mere addition of a dose of pluralism. In
addition to opening civil society to more diverse forms of
participation, doing democracy differently insists that all actors act
ethically by interrogating any privileges they enjoy as a result of
structural power imbalances. The most powerful participants of civil
society themselves would accept responsibility for developing
mechanisms that can enable them to address inequalities in power.
A related element of a transformative strategy would be for
powerful agents of transnational civil society to listen to and value the
experiences and wisdom of their less powerful counterparts. While
this may be the goal of many human rights advocates, rarely is it
carried out in practice. We could draw from our understanding of a
participatory norm of democracy in shaping procedures that would
bring non-elites into the debate on human rights on their own terms.
As a practical matter, at international meetings discussing human
rights norms, non-elite groups "might be empowered to have control
of agenda-setting, determine the questions of importance, and run
meetings according to procedures they understand".' 38 Flexible rules
and transparent processes should be developed for the inclusion of
NGOs in international decision-making fora to expand and formalize
their participation. Here the example of NGO participation in some
international law contexts sets the foundation for further
development. 139 These and related measures would add meaningful
context to the norm of participation in transnational civil society' 40 and
lead towards transformative, bottom up participatory democracy.
13 Abdullahi An-Na'im. What Do We Mean By Universal?, 23 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, No. 4/5,
1994, at 120,122.
137 Otto, Rethinking Universality, supra note 76, at 33.
3 Id. at 38.
13 See, e.g., Ellen Hay, Increasing Accountability for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of
Biodiversity: An Issue of Transnational Global Character, 6 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L & POL'Y 1 (1995).
140 Moreover, greater access to international procedures would lay the foundation for improved
accountability of international organizations generally. See David A. Wirth, Legitimacy, Accountability,
and Partnership: A Model for Advocacy on Third World Environmental Issues, 100 YALE L. J. 2645
(1991).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Instead of rejecting the notion of democracy, advocates for social
justice should embrace it and give it content so that it can become a
mechanism for positive social transformation. This means moving
democracy beyond the state and to the levels of civil society. It also
entails going beyond representative democracy to a form of
participatory democracy from below which emphasizes the norms of
participation, transparency and accountability. The framing rules in
such an enterprise would shape and reflect changes in power structures
and, accordingly, influence the new actors occupying spaces opened
by the change. Nongovernmental organizations could play a key role
in doing democracy differently, but so far their potential remains
unfulfilled.
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